Abstract. Since Wireless Sensor Nodes (WSNs) have limited resources, achieving secure data transmissions among nodes is a challenge. Hence, efficient key management schemes with lightweight ciphers are essential. Many asymmetric key or public key mechanisms have been developed. However, they are unsuitable for secure group communications in WSNs, because sensor nodes cannot provide sufficient CPU, memory and bandwidth to address complex operations. Besides, only a few group key agreements are integrated into secure data transmissions. Therefore, this study presents a Cluster-based Elliptic Curve Key Management (CECKM) scheme for secure data transmissions in WSNs. The proposed security scheme relies on elliptic curves instead of logarithmic curves, and exploits a smaller key size to achieve comparable security levels than Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) and Diffie-Hellman (DH) cryptosystems [1] . Meanwhile, the proposed scheme provides a dynamic, rapid and efficient group key synchronization mechanism in numerous sensor nodes without reconfiguring the entire key system when sensor nodes participate in or depart from WSNs.
Introduction
Key managements in WSNs have been an important issue. The properties of wireless communications are vulnerable to a disclosed environment [2] . Many related research papers have been presented. The proposals can be classified into the following categories: (1) single master key, (2) full pair-wise key, (3) random key pre-distribution scheme, and (4) group-based key.
In a single master key scheme, all nodes share a common key (master key). This method secures data transmissions between sensor nodes, and is simple to implement without a large memory requirement. However, the entire network is compromised if an adversary captures the master key of one node.
A full pair-wise key scheme adopts a unique pair key between each two nodes to encrypt transmitted data [3] [4] . Thus, each node needs pre-distributing and storing n-1 keys, and each WSN has n(n-1)/2 keys. In this system, each node needs to store a large number of keys for securing communications. Moreover, the system needs to update pair-wise keys for all nodes when increasing or decreasing the number of nodes. Although, this scheme is secure and resilient, a compromised node merely affects the secure link between the other nodes connecting with it, and does not affect the security among un-compromised nodes. However, the huge memory and storage overhead make it inappropriate for large-scale sensor networks. Additionally, the node addition and deletion complicate system re-keying.
Random key pre-distribution scheme relies on a probability of a common shared key between two nodes [5] . Each node has a key ring of k randomly chosen keys from the system key pool p. If two nodes have a common key, then a secure link exists between them. The larger key ring size increases the probability of sharing common keys and connections between two nodes, meanwhile increasing the storage capacity required for each sensor node. However, the key ring size raises the compromised effect on a path link shared between un-compromised nodes. Moreover, a node possibly shares a key with several nodes, making it unable to recognize which node is connected with.
The group-based key method divides sensor nodes into several disjoint groups [6] . Each sensor node has a common intra-group key to secure data communications with its neighbors. The group-based key method outperforms other methods in terms of performance, scalability, and storage overhead [7] . Recently, several ID-based authenticated group key agreements and certificateless authenticated group key agreements for dynamic groups are proposed. They focus on the intra-group key management. Therefore, the inter-group key management is a complex issue to implement.
The above methods concentrate on key managements in WSNs, and lack secure data transmission mechanisms, which should be integrated into key managements. This study presents a CECKM scheme for cluster-based sensor networks to achieve rapid and efficient key synchronization, even though nodes dynamically participate in and depart from the network. Additionally, this study exploits the proposed key management to achieve secure data transmissions.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement. Section 3 describes the Cluster-based Elliptic Curve Key Management scheme. Section 4 presents the secure data transmission. Section 5 depicts the security analyses. Conclusions and future work are finally drawn in Section 6.
The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement, ECDH
Since WSNs have limited resources, many security schemes provide high security level functions, such as asymmetric key and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), but they need a lot of resources, and therefore sensor networks cannot perform the security functions very well. To date, several studies have adopted ECDH based security methods for sensor networks, such as the studies by Sklavos et al. [2] The well-known Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is a variant of the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol, using elliptic curve cryptography that allows two parties to establish a shared secret key (session key) over an insecure channel. Two parties then exploit this key to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric key scheme. ECDH with 160-bit key lengths provides the same security level as the DH secret sharing protocol. However, the original DH protocol needs a key of at least 1024 bits to achieve adequate security, and therefore requires high CPU and memory capabilities to perform exponential operations. Unfortunately, sensor nodes with limited resources have insufficient power to handle the overhead. Table 1 compares the security levels of common cryptographic key lengths. Smaller key size 160-bit in the ECC performs comparable security levels to 1024-bit RSA. The ECC has efficient operation, and is indeed practicable for wireless networks with limited resources. Therefore, ECDH is quite suited for WSNs.
Consider the case in ECDH, where sensor node A wants to establish a shared key with node B, as shown in Fig.1 . The public parameters (a prime and base point P as a generator in Diffe-Hellman, coefficients a and b, elliptic curve y 2 =x 3 +ax+b) must first be set. Additionally, each party must have an appropriate key pair for elliptic curve cryptography, comprising a ECC private key K (a randomly selected integer) and a public key Z (where Z = KP). Let a key pair of node A denote (K A , Z A ), and a key pair of node B denote (K B , Z B ). Each party must have the other party's public key. Node A calculates Z A = K A P, while node B calculates Z B = K B P. Both parties calculate the shared key
The protocol is secure because it reveals nothing (except public keys, which are not secret), and because no party can calculate the private key of the other unless it can solve the computing Diffie-Hellman problem. Additionally, this study assumes that the system has a secure Certification Authority (CA) server, which provides a trusted digital signature to both parties signing the public keys before exchanging them. Thus, the system can ensure the identity of each other and avoid man-in-the-middle attacks. 
Cluster-Based Elliptic Curve Key Management Scheme
This section presents the proposed a cluster-based key management (CECKM) scheme. In numerous nodes, clustering forms a resilient and scalable architecture in which the entire network is separated into several clusters with gateway nodes managing inter-cluster communication. The proposed cluster-based key management method is based on an improved cluster infrastructure. We assume that CBKM divides an entire sensor network into a number of clusters using an appropriate cluster algorithm for deployment. Besides, the entire network only has a root base station, and each cluster has a cluster head named base station with sufficient computing power, huge memory, and constant power. Generally, the base station and root base station comprise a powerful computer and differ from sensor nodes, and they never collapse. For simplicity, we assume the base stations and root base station provide constant power and are secure, and the base stations are elected and deployed before arranging the sensor nodes according to secure operations, and the base station can directly connect to each sensor node of the intra-cluster. Additionally, the base station regularly broadcasts a hello message that includes member information and the cluster identity to each member of the intra-cluster; therefore each node can determine the geographic coordinates of other nodes.
In each cluster, the base station is the cluster head, which serves as a group controller to perform key management. This architecture rapidly synchronizes the internal cluster key for numerous members, performs key exchange intelligently among cluster heads, and provides secure data transmissions for subsequent communications. The cluster-based cluster architecture is flexible for group key management, and comprises three entities:
Root base station (RBS): a system cluster key controller, managing the system cluster key operation for the entire system. When the entire system achieves the key synchronization, each node obtains the same system cluster key for future security communications. RBS is the parent of base station; it calculates the system cluster key of the entire network, and distributes a descendent cluster key to each base station.
Base station (BS): a descendent cluster key controller of a cluster, managing the descendent cluster operation for a cluster. When a cluster achieves the key synchronization, each node in the cluster obtains the same descendent cluster key for future security communications.
Member node (M xi ): after the authentication of BS, a sensor node i participates in a cluster x, and acquires a descendent cluster key for communications. Restated, RBS is the system cluster key controller, and BS is the descendent cluster key controller. RBS and BS are generated before the deployment of sensor nodes. Figure 2 illustrates the proposed model.
Certain settings minimize the amount of key agreement protocols performed in each cluster, particularly in very large clusters, and the computing load rises as the cluster size grows. The proposed approach consists of the following steps. Phase 1. A base station BS x is deployed as a descendent cluster key controller for the cluster members M xi , where x denotes the cluster identity, 1≦x≦n, and i denotes the amount of sensor nodes in a cluster, with i and n ∊ integer. Phase 2. The system deploys the most powerful and secure base station as the key controller of the entire network (sink node or data collector) named RBS, which cooperates with the other base station BS x (1≦x≦n) to generate the system cluster key for the entire system. Phase 3. Each BS x (BS 1 , BS 2 , BS 3 ,…, BS n-1 ) performs the descendent cluster key agreement protocol as show in Fig.4 (for BS 1 ) , and generates a descendent cluster key KC x P, x∊ [1, n-1] using ECDH. The detailed descendent cluster key agreement is as follows:
Step 1. First of all, each member node M 1i in BS 1 cluster generates a private key KM 1i and calculates the public key KM 1i P (P is a well-known generator in Diffe-Hellman) using ECDH, and then broadcasts KM 1i P to the other nodes in cluster 1. When M 1x (x≠i) receives the key, it generates KM 1x P, and multiplies KM 1x P with KM 1i P. Eventually, each node has the same product KM 11 PKM 12 P…KM 1n-1 P, as shown in Fig. 4① .
Step 2. M11 extracts out its own factor KM11P, and unicasts the KM12PKM13P…KM1n-1P to BS1. Simultaneously, the other node M1i, i ∊[2, n-1], performs the same procedures. To provide a secure unicast channel, the message directly sent from the sender to the receiver is encrypt to securely unicast the extracted result to BS1, as shown in Fig. 4② .
Step 3. BS1 receives the KM12PKM13P…KM1n-1P from M11, and then generates its own key KM1nP. Subsequently, BS1 computes KM12PKM13P…KM1n-1PKM1nP, and encrypts the message to securely unicast it back to M11, as shown in Fig. 4③ . Simultaneously, BS1 performs the same procedures to compute the keys for M1i, i ∊[2, n-1], and unicasts the results to M1i. Consequently, M11 receives the unicasted key, multiplies it with its own key KM11P, and obtains the descendent cluster key KM11PKM12P…KM1n-1PKM1nP. Similarly, each node eventually acquires the same descendent cluster key KM11PKM12P…KM1n-1PKM1nP = , extracts its own factor KC i P, and then unicasts the result to RBS, as shown in Fig.5③ . Phase 7. In the final step, RBS obtains all descendent cluster keys from each BS x , and then multiplies its own KC n P by each descendent cluster key, and encrypts the message to securely unicast The above phases present the synchronization of the system cluster key for an entire network. Under different scenarios, because cluster heads or normal nodes may participate in or depart from the network, a root cluster head may be cracked or replaced. Since the proposed scheme only exploits addition and multiplication operations, and therefore rapidly achieves the system key synchronization.
Secure Data Transmission Method
This section describes different schemes for intra-cluster and inter-cluster secure data transmissions, and applies the descendent cluster key, system cluster key and ECDH session key on various scenarios to enhance secure transmission efficiency.
The descendent cluster key scheme provides intra-cluster secure data transmissions. The system cluster key scheme provides inter-cluster secure data transmissions, and the ECDH session key scheme provides flexible secure data transmissions for intra-cluster, inter-cluster and gateway mode secure data transmissions. The detailed description is as follows. 
System/Descendent Cluster Key Secure Data Transmission Mode
This mode provides most efficient secure data transmissions, when the system achieves synchronization of the system/descendent cluster key. The entire network secures transmission data using the same key. This operational mode is similar to a single master key scheme. We state the intra-cluster and inter-cluster secure data transmissions as follows:
(1).Intra-Cluster Secure Data Transmission: When a sink node (a data collector) named M 13 dynamically enters the cluster to collect information, the cluster head BS 1 first performs the descendent key operations to calculate the descendent key. Subsequently, in the same cluster, M 11 , M 12 and BS 1 deliver their collection data to M 13 , as shown in Fig. 6 . This mode encrypts and decrypts data for secure transmissions using the same descendent cluster key, and the detailed secure data transmission processes from M 11 delivering data to M 13 are as follows:
M11 M12 EKKC1P [M11|DM11|HMAC(DM11)]
Sensor node M 11 exploits the descendent cluster key KC 1 P to encrypt the routing path of passing nodes, a message DM 11 (here we assume that M 11 senses data DM 11 . If not, DM 11 is blank) and a Hash Message Authenticated Code HMAC(DM 11 ).
The hash operations take the descendent cluster key KC 1 P and DM 11 as inputs, and output HMAC(DM 11 ). Subsequently, M 11 places these data into the corresponding fields, and then M 11 delivers the encrypted data to the next sensor node M 12 .
As M 12 receives the transmitted data, M 12 decrypts them using the descendent cluster key KC 1 P. Subsequently, M 12 verifies the integrity of HMAC(DM 11 ) using KC 1 P, then adds its identity M 12 into the routing path, and aggregates sensed data DM 12 with DM 11 . Eventually, M 12 generates HMAC(DM 12 ||DM 11 ) using KC 1 P, and then delivers it to the next sensor node BS 1 .
After receiving data, BS 1 performs the same procedures as the above steps, and transmits the encrypted data to the destination node M 13 .
BS1 M13 EKKC1P[BS1M12M11|(DBS1||DM12||DM11)|HMAC(DBS1||DM12||DM11)]
M 13 decrypts the received data, and verifies HMAC(DBS 1 ||DM 12 ||DM 11 ) using KC 1 P to determine whether these data have been altered.
The intra-cluster secure data transmissions scheme is plain and straightforward, and the previous single master key scheme is a special case in our proposed cluster model.
(2).Inter-Cluster Secure Data Transmission: If two nodes are located on different clusters, then the secure data transmissions exploit the system cluster key to secure data transmissions. The transmission processes are similar to the intra-cluster transmission mode. Nodes only replace the encryption/decryption keys with the system cluster key KP during transmission, exploit KP to perform hash functions for HMAC, and verify the integrity of the transmitted message.
Secure Data Transmission Analyses and Computing Evaluations
This section provides several security analyses and evaluates the performance of the proposed schemes. This study also proves that the proposed schemes improve the efficiency of secure data transmissions, reduce key resynchronization time when nodes are leaving or joining, combine key agreement protocols with secure data transmissions, and provide a flexible and scalable mechanism for distributing key agreement protocols. The security analysis is as follows.
(1)Confidentiality and authentication Sensor nodes employ a session key to encrypt transmitted data. Only the node with the same session key can decrypt the encrypted data. The other nodes are not aware of the session key, and therefore cannot decrypt the encrypted data.
(2)Fault tolerance In this scheme, sensor nodes have multiple routing paths. Once the dedicated routing path collapses, sensor nodes adapt the gateway mode to perform secure data transmissions, and the system regains normality. This method is rapid and efficient for fault-tolerant routing in peer-to-peer secure data transmissions.
(3)Data accuracy and integrity This study exploits HMAC to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the transmitted data. During the transmission, the sender computes HMAC using the system cluster key or descendent cluster key. Thus, the system avoids that malicious nodes exploit session keys to pass through the verification of HMAC. As the receiver obtains the transmitted data, then takes plain messages and the related cluster key as inputs, and verifies the integrity of HMAC. Given a random number y, HMAC is an irreversible operation, and x cannot be computed such that H(x)=y. Moreover, when a≠b, then H(a)≠H(b). Therefore, if any sensor node modifies the transmitted data during transmission, the receiver detects the unmatched HMAC instantly and recognizes the tampered data.
(4)Encryption/Decryption operation Since sensor nodes have limited resources, asymmetric key and PKI schemes are unsuitable for WSNs. In this study, each node only conserves a session key to encrypt/decrypt data, and exploits a hash function, such as HMAC-160 or RIPEMD-160, to verify the integrity of transmitted data. However, hash functions and session key operations consume few resources during secure data transmissions. Consequently, the plain operations are highly suited for WSNs.
Conclusions
This study presents a Cluster-based Cluster Elliptic Curve Key Management (CECKM) mechanism for secure group communications. The proposed scheme achieves the same security level as Diffe-Hellman and RSA with shorter keys. Besides, CECKM performs very well for key agreement protocols on sensor nodes. Simulation results indicate that CECKM consumes less system key resynchronization time than DH and GDH, and is also quite suited for implementation in constrained environments such as WSNs and ad hoc networks.
